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1. Background history.  
Similarly to other European countries, trade unions have played a very 
important role at the origins of modern forms of social security also in Italy, 
although with some delay compared to the continent’s major countries due 
to the late start of industrialization and the consequent late development 
of the labour movement. Some might say that, also in Italy, social security 
originates as the expression of self-organization and mutual self-protection 
within the labour movement and the incipient industrial trade-unionism (let 
us consider the somehow founding role of labour solidarity experienced in 
Italy through mutualistic collective funds and cooperation)1.  
When the first form of compulsory social security was established with 
law n. 80 of 1898 on industrial injuries and accidents at work, the Italian 
legislator did not adopt the Bismarckian corporatist model, although taking 
inspiration from the German laws2, as it preferred to attribute a distinctly 
public nature and character to the new social insurance fund. However, the 
1898 law did not attribute any legal monopoly to the newly established 
national fund, thus allowing compulsory insurance to be fulfilled also 
through private insurance companies3. Such a legal monopoly was 
established only at the beginning of the Thirties, during the fascist regime. 
In the years when the foundations of modern social security are being 
laid in Italy, at the turn of the Nineteenth and Twentieth century, the very 
same public intervention remains within the strong limits allowed by the 
predominant liberal ideology (the first form of compulsory pension 
insurance is dated 1919). Thus restricted, the State’s role inevitably allows 
a significant amount of freedom for private-collective welfare and unions 
find plenty of places where they can strengthen their incipient role in 
ambits that had not yet been accessed by public intervention (as it typically 
occurs in regards to job placement, where Labour Chambers electively 
operate).  
This framework is bound to change radically with the rise of fascism. 
Since its early days the fascist regime imparts a very strong public-
authoritarian imprinting to the whole system of collective labour relations 
(already through law no. 563 of 1926) and, later on, to the organization of 
welfare and social security, conceived as founding elements for the 
development of the totalitarian nation-State. The comprehensive reform 
programme performed in the Thirties finalises a project of overall public-
                                                          
1 Cf. A. Cherubini, Storia della previdenza sociale, Roma, 1977, p. 10 ff. 
2 See G. Gozzi, Modelli politici e questione sociale in Italia e in Germania fra Otto e Novecento, 
Bologna, 1988, p. 11 ff. 
3 Cf. A. Cherubini, Dalla libertà all’obbligo. La previdenza sociale fra Giolitti e Mussolini, Milano, 
1998, p. 7 ff. 
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law re-organisation of the Italian social security system, conceived as a 
tool to be used through the social-economic policies of the fascist regime 
and as a fundamental element of building of a mass-consensus for the 
totalitarian State. Fascist corporatism denies freedom to the intermediate 
societal bodies in general by absorbing them within the state apparatus for 
the sake of corporative solidarity and the overcoming of class conflicts4.  
It is only through the Liberation and the establishing of a democratic 
Republic that free unions go back to having their – constitutionally 
guaranteed – role as main political trigger for the development of the social 
protection system, being an original self-constituting and self-legitimising 
social group (formazione sociale) aimed at the promotion of fundamental 
rights of the individual and as free and self-organized forms of workers’ 
collective solidarity (Articles 2 and 3 of the Italian Constitution). This 
leading role played by the unions is mainly acknowledged by the 
Constitution in its typical capacity as negotiator in the realm of collective 
bargaining (Art. 39), by expressly introducing the principle of (individual 
and collective) freedom to self-organise welfare (Art. 38, par. 5: 
L’assistenza privata è libera).  
2. Social partners and the institutional participation to 
the social security system. 
As the predominant role envisioned by the Constitution itself is played 
on the field of collective bargaining, as we shall see shortly, nevertheless 
we shall not disregard one aspect that has characterized Italian social 
legislation mainly during the 1970’s and at least up until the reform 
introduced between the Eighties and the early Nineties in a logic of 
retrenchment of the Italian welfare state. During the period of greatest 
historical expansion of the Italian welfare state (precisely between the 
1970’s and 1980’s), unions – especially the most representative general 
confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL) – were acknowledged the important 
role of institutional participation to the management of social security5.  
The Italian legislator progressively allowed unions’ participation to the 
management of the country’s major institutions of public social security, 
without strictly adopting the neo-corporative model typical of certain 
experiences in Northern-Europe. Such a form of institutional participation 
                                                          
4 Cf. C. Giorgi, La previdenza del regime. Storia dell’Inps durante il fascismo, Bologna, 2004, 
p. 23 ff. 
5 Cf. T. Treu, Sicurezza sociale e partecipazione, in Rivista di diritto del lavoro, 1970, I, p. 137 
ff.; M. Persiani, La partecipazione dei rappresentanti dei lavoratori alla gestione degli enti 
previdenziali, in Sicurezza sociale, 1970, p. 332 ff. See, also, M. Cinelli, Organizzazione 
amministrativa del lavoro, in M. Dell’Olio (ed.), Diritto del lavoro – 2 – Dizionari del diritto 
privato, directed by N. Irti, Milano, 1981, p. 235 ff. 
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rather derives from a general inclination that characterizes that historical 
period, of co-opting the most representative unions in the management of 
welfare public administration, acknowledging a role that may be defined, 
broadly speaking, as political and administrative at the same time. The role 
attributed to the most representative trade unions is actually placed within 
a wider dynamic, underway in Italy in those days, definitely characterized 
by a movement for the expansion of participative democracy and the 
leading role played by major mass organizations (political parties and trade 
union confederations). 
This model of institutional participation, however, has been widely 
outweighed starting from the reform adopted at the end of the 1980’s and 
throughout the Nineties. Although strongly disempowered, this political-
institutional participative dimension, however, has not been completely 
abandoned6. A significant institutional participation of the most 
representative unions, in fact, has been maintained in the current system 
through the supervisory councils (CIV – Consigli di indirizzo e vigilanza) 
belonging to the major public welfare institutions (INPS – National Social 
Security Institute and INAIL – National Institute for Insurance against 
Accidents at Work), the purpose of which is to define the programmes and 
identify the guidelines to be implemented by these social security 
institutions, while determining multi-annual strategic objectives whose 
implementation and management, however, is totally and autonomously 
assigned to the institutional governance and related technical structure of 
INPS and INAIL7. 
3. Unions as qualified providers of welfare instrumental 
services.  
The role that unions are authorized to carry out, by law, through the 
so called patronati differs from the participatory role, although it is 
somehow linked to an administrative-type function in the management of 
the welfare system. Although already foreseen in the liberal era and 
organically recognized by law since 1947, that model for union participation 
to the administration of public welfare is typical and peculiar of the Italian 
experience. After the reform of 2001, the patronati carry out assistance 
and protection functions in support of workers, retirees and more in general 
of all the citizens who turn to them to gain access to the benefits provided 
for by the Italian welfare state. By law, the patronati are acknowledged as 
legal entities governed by private law, whose purpose is social utility; at 
the same time they are a direct expression of union organisations and – 
                                                          
6 See M. Cinelli, Diritto della previdenza sociale, Torino, 2016, p. 134. 
7 Cf. B.G. Mattarella, Sindacati e pubblici poteri, Milano, 2003, p. 75 ff. 
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through the public financing that they benefit from – they broadly 
contribute to the overall financial needs of the unions that they represent. 
The patronati carry out an essential role in guaranteeing access of 
citizens and workers to social security benefits and, to some extent, they 
represent the privileged institutional interface to the public social security 
institutions. Therefore – through the patronati – unions act as qualified 
suppliers of instrumental services for the access to welfare and for 
exercising social citizenship rights. Thus, it is a matter of a role that is 
prevalently administrative and of consultancy nature which, however, has 
evident political implications as it confers on the union organizations the 
important functions of filtering and of institutional mediation between 
welfare public administration, on one hand, and citizens and workers, on 
the other8. 
4. The negotiating role of social partners in the Italian 
welfare mix. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the main role played by social 
partners in the Italian welfare system is the one that unions carry out in 
their typical capacity as bargaining players in the vast and diversified 
universe that may be called contractual social security (previdenza 
contrattuale)9. This – non-technical – expression is used to designate the 
complex and articulated series of measures and provisions of a broadly 
welfare and social security nature, whose primary or original source is 
collective bargaining and which, therefore, are an expression of the 
collective autonomy constitutionally given to union organizations (Art. 39, 
Italian Constitution, in conjunction with Art. 38, par. 5). The connotation 
that differentiates and unites these forms of welfare and contractual social 
security – which may have very different objectives and purposes (and, 
therefore, correspondingly different regulations, e.g. from the point of view 
of tax treatment) – is the collective bargaining source and their origin 
within the industrial relations system. In fact, this is a matter of forms of 
contractual welfare –  that can be supplementary, integrative, additional 
and even alternative (i.e., substitutive) to the social protection provided 
for by the State – which are established by (national or decentralised) 
collective bargaining, and partly regulated by it in a rather complex and 
articulated relationship with the law. The ways in which these forms of 
contractual welfare interact with the public system of social security, and 
                                                          
8 Cf. M. Campedelli, P. Carrozza (a cura di), Innovazioni nel welfare e nuovo patrocinio. 
Promuovere cittadinanza dopo il secolo breve, Bologna, 2009. 
9 M. Squeglia, La “previdenza contrattuale”. Un modello di nuova generazione per la tutela 
dei bisogni previdenziali socialmente rilevanti, Torino, 2014. 
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therefore with the legal sources, are significantly different and result in 
widely diversified forms of interrelation between the law and collective 
agreements. Being unable to carry out a thorough analysis in this context, 
which would require a complex investigation, we may assert that within 
the framework of a broadly contractual welfare, law and contractual 
bargaining engage in a relationship in which the balance between public 
and private – that is between the variegated role of the law and the spaces 
left to freedom and collective autonomy – vary considerably according to 
the welfare sector considered10.  
Hereinafter I will provide the examples I consider to be most important 
of this different interaction between the law and collective agreements 
inherent to contractual welfare. We can briefly anticipate that with regard 
to the supplementary pension system (which is the most important 
expression of contractual social security in Italy to date), collective 
agreements, and primarily national sector and branch collective 
bargaining, are promoted by the law which, however, sets important limits 
to the autonomy of the social partners in order to pursue public interests, 
laying down a mandatory legal framework. With regard to bilateral 
solidarity funds (fondi bilaterali di solidarietà) – which are active in the vast 
field of social security safety nets and in the protection against 
unemployment – the role of the law is even stricter, so much to move 
towards an actual public regulation (and organic incorporation into the 
public welfare apparatus) of these forms deriving from collective 
autonomy. Lastly, a different case altogether is the so-called corporate 
welfare (welfare aziendale), where the role played by the law is primarily 
promotional – due to the vigorous fiscal and contributory incentives –, 
allowing social partners (this time mostly involved in collective bargaining 
at a company and decentralised level) to benefit from a broad freedom for 
the implementation of mainly private-collective interests.  
The different forms of public-private interaction, between the law and 
collective agreements, that are generated by the three different forms of 
contractual welfare considered (supplementary pensions, bilateral 
solidarity funds and corporate welfare), therefore, require now a slightly 
extended analysis11.  
 
                                                          
10 Cf. M. Cinelli, S. Giubboni, Lineamenti di diritto della previdenza sociale, Milano, 2018, p. 
235 ff. 
11 See generally M. Cinelli, “Pubblico”, “privato” e Costituzione nelle attuali dinamiche della 
previdenza, in Rivista del diritto della sicurezza sociale, 2017, p. 401 ff.  
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5. Social partners and supplementary pension 
provisions. 
Although organically regulated by law only in 1993, supplementary 
pension schemes remain the primary expression of contractual welfare in 
Italy12. Albeit the legislative reform of 2005 shows a pluralistic source 
system, thus allowing the establishment of open pension funds (fondi 
pensione aperti) by companies in the banking and insurance sectors, 
collective agreements remain the privileged founding source. The 
legislator’s support towards the collective pension funds actually leads to 
an indirect but nonetheless certain promotion of national sectorial 
collective bargaining, which, in fact, maintains the role of main establishing 
source for supplementary pension schemes in Italy.  
The legal favor towards collective bargaining – especially at the branch 
and sector level – is traceable in significant aspects of the legal rules on 
supplementary provisions still today. For example, although in principle a 
worker is entitled to the free portability of his/her supplementary pension 
position from a closed collective pension fund to an open pension fund, the 
employer’s obligation to contribute for the future to the new pension 
scheme chosen by the worker is made conditional on the provision laid 
down by the same collective agreement. This aspect of the legal framework 
on the portability of individual pension positions shows the legislator’s 
persisting support of collective funds established by social partners on the 
assumption that only broad contractual categories of workers may enable 
those economies of scale that are necessary for an adequate financial 
development of complementary pension schemes.  
And exactly on these terms, the law opted for a model of joint 
management by the social partners (namely workers’ unions and employer 
associations who have signed the collective agreement establishing that 
pension scheme), although through the imposition upon the designated 
representatives of rigorous standards of expertise and good repute. 
Moreover, we must consider that – generally – the law imposes a 
professional management of the pension funds’ financial assets, requiring 
that relevant managing conventions be signed by accredited financial 
intermediaries. Therefore, in terms of management we can assert that, for 
the safeguard of the pension savings of member workers, the principle of 
joint self-governance by social partners is tempered by conferring its 
professional management to qualified providers of the financial market (in 
compliance to European directives).  
                                                          
12 Cf. S. Giubboni, La previdenza complementare tra libertà individuale ed interesse collettivo, 
Bari, 2009. 
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Collective bargaining, especially the sectorial/branch level type, is thus 
promoted by the law which, at the same time, imposes limitations upon 
the trade unions’ collective autonomy in order to safeguard public interest 
and especially to ensure that the aim of supplementary pensions, although 
reflecting the union’s contractual freedom, is to guarantee adequate levels 
of social security coverage along with mandatory public arrangements. The 
most debated limits which, however, for some time now, the Constitutional 
Court (e.g. through ruling no. 393 of 2000) has been considering to be 
compliant with the constitutional parameters (Arts. 38, 39 and 41 Italian 
Constitution), actually involve the relationship between mandatory public 
schemes and supplementary pension forms. Among other limits, in fact, 
the law states the rule according to which benefits of supplementary 
pension funds may be provided to member workers as long as these are at 
the same time entitled to access benefits from the public basic social 
protection scheme. This rule (and others having the same purpose) 
imposes a strict functional limitation upon collective autonomy, as it aims 
at guaranteeing that supplementary pensions ensure more adequate levels 
of social security coverage for workers, along with the benefits provided by 
the mandatory public pension schemes. 
Nevertheless, we shouldn’t ignore that in the Italian system, the 
adhesion of an individual worker to a supplementary pension scheme, even 
the one established by the collective agreement applicable to the 
employment relationship, is always a free choice of the individual, in the 
sense that it derives from a free personal decision. This is a very 
problematic aspect of the existing legal framework, that has been criticized 
by many and, nonetheless, it goes to show that supplementary pensions, 
even those deriving from collective bargaining, may be aimed at increasing 
workers’ social protection only when their (potential) beneficiaries freely 
decide to adhere. 
6. Social partners and bilateral solidarity funds. 
A different role altogether is the one played by social partners in the 
establishment and management of bilateral solidarity funds, since in this 
case the Italian legislator resolutely opted in favour of a more accentuated 
public-law connotation of the whole system13. The legal framework is quite 
complex, and for the limited purposes of this analysis we can see that 
bilateral funds – originally – are perhaps among the most authentic and 
significant expression of the cooperative-type dynamics of the Italian 
system of industrial relations, historically characterized by the prevalence 
                                                          
13 See e.g. S. Renga, Bilateralità e sostegno del reddito, in Rivista del diritto della sicurezza 
sociale, 2018, p. 433 ff. 
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of strongly dialectic and adversarial cultures and approaches to industrial 
conflict. At first, in fact, bilateral funds are entities founded by the social 
partners on an equal basis through (national or, in certain fields, local) 
collective bargaining in order for workers and companies to achieve certain 
mutual-type social benefits. 
In particular, the establishment of bilateral mutual funds is required 
and regulated by the law in order to guarantee that workers are provided 
with protection whilst in employment in the event of reduction or 
suspension of the working activity for reasons provided for under the law 
on ordinary or extraordinary wage subsidies (cassa integrazione guadagni). 
The introduction of the funds is originally free, although in practice it has 
been made compulsory by the legislator (starting with the 2012 reform), 
through the establishment of a residual public fund that is precisely 
mandatory for all sectors not covered by the legal protection concerning 
wage subsidies (cassa integrazione guadagni) for all employers employing 
over five workers on average. 
Besides the purpose of guaranteeing workers with protection whilst in 
employment, in the event of working time reduction or suspension, 
bilateral solidarity funds may have the following objectives: a) ensure that 
workers receive supplementary benefits, in terms of the amount or 
duration, compared to those provided for under the law in the event of 
termination of employment, or supplementary benefits in terms of the 
amount, with respect to general unemployment insurance; b) provide 
special allowances for income support, approved within the framework of 
early retirement facilitation processes, for those workers who are going to 
meet the necessary requirements for old-age or early retirement in the 
following five years (although, through various measures, the law has 
prolonged such period in certain cases and under certain circumstances); 
c) contribute to the financing of EU training programmes. In terms of the 
later objectives, these funds may also be established with respect to 
sectors and size classes of the employers that already act under the law 
on wage subsidies.  
In this respect, the most representative union organizations and 
business associations at national level, comparatively speaking, stipulate 
collective agreements, including cross-sectorial ones, concerning the 
creation of bilateral solidarity funds. Once the union initiative has been 
achieved, though, the law takes action to frame bilateral solidarity funds 
within a logic that considerably privileges a dominating public-law 
dimension. In fact, once established by the social partners, bilateral 
solidarity funds consequently take on a public nature and function. In fact, 
following the establishing collective agreement, by a decree of the Ministry 
of Labour in conjunction with the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the 
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fund is established as a special fund within the INPS. In this way, the fund 
is transformed into a public body and its budget – although typically 
entirely financed through the social security contributions paid by 
companies and workers – is taken up as a portion in the general budget of 
the INPS. 
Alternatively to such ordinary public model, although only in relation 
to very specific sectors (e.g., temporary work agencies), the law allows 
bilateral solidarity funds to be deployed within a private law framework. 
Outside this framework, however, the general rule has become to trace 
back any expression of collective bilateralism to the public system run by 
the major public social security institution in Italy (i.e., the INPS). 
Accordingly, the bilateral solidarity funds’ management committees 
established at the INPS are fully-fledged internal entities of the public social 
security institute. The members of these entities are designated on an 
equal footing by the most representative trade union and employers’ 
organizations who sign the collective agreement, but their actual 
appointment shall be made by a decree of the Ministry of Labour, as they 
are performing a public function. Accordingly, both the social benefits 
provided through these funds and the mandatory social security 
contributions that finances them are, in all intents and purposes, of a public 
legal nature.  
In the case of bilateral solidarity funds, therefore, we are witnessing a 
very original phenomenon of fusion, so to say, between collective 
agreements, which maintain the role of establishing source, and 
regulations governed by public law14. The legislator’s support to this form 
of collective mutual solidarity, which is specifically expressed through the 
bilateral funds, goes as far as to achieving an actual up-take of the 
management and of the very functions of social protection that these funds 
carry-out within the system of mandatory public social security.  
7. Social partners and corporate welfare. 
As stated above, a totally different case is represented by the so-called 
corporate welfare15. This term usually applies to the series of contractual 
or unilateral initiatives carried out by the employer and aimed at increasing 
the wellbeing of workers and their families through a different distribution 
of earnings, which may consist of compensation benefits, a direct provision 
of services, or a mixture of the two solutions. 
                                                          
14 S. Giubboni, I fondi bilaterali di solidarietà nel prisma della riforma degli ammortizzatori 
sociali, in Giornale di diritto del lavoro e di relazioni industriali, 2014, p. 715 ff. 
15 Cf. T. Treu (ed.), Welfare aziendale. Migliorare la produttività e il benessere dei dipendenti, 
Milano, 2013. 
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It, obviously, involves a very broad definition that may potentially be 
suitable to cover a different and variegated universe of non-monetary 
services and benefits, going from supplementary health care to the same 
supplementary pensions, from economic support for families, to education 
and training. Therefore, a very wide range of benefits for the workers that 
results in a package of possibilities for the access to services that are a 
useful complement to traditional monetary remuneration. 
In this field, the promotion of the role of collective bargaining is the 
result of a rather recent decision of the Italian legislator, which developed 
into the provision of a very considerable series of fiscal advantages in 
support of both the companies and the workers. Recent empirical 
researches show that company collective bargaining is making extensive 
use of the opportunities offered by the law and that – as expected – 
company welfare projects are undergoing their greatest development 
precisely at the decentralised (business or plant) level. However, more 
recently, forms of corporate welfare have been foreseen also by national 
sector collective bargaining (just like for the important case related to the 
metal industry)16.  
Corporate welfare raises very delicate issues and it lends itself to very 
problematic evaluations. On one hand, it certainly represents a new frontier 
of the Italian welfare mix where – thanks to the fiscal incentives granted 
by the law – collective bargaining is called upon to play an important role 
of social innovation, with positive implications on the wellbeing of workers 
and on companies’ productivity17. However, on the other hand, the risk is 
to increase the many inequalities that afflict the Italian system (large 
companies vs. small employers, rich territories vs. economically depressed 
regions, standard employees vs. atypical workers etc.), by actually 
contradicting that purpose of social solidarity which should, conversely, 
always justify a strongly advantageous fiscal treatment. In other words, 
the risk is that, on the basis of the fiscal incentives granted by the law, 
corporate welfare may accentuate socioeconomic cleavages to the 
advantage of strong segments of the Italian labour market, with the result 
of increasing inequalities that are not followed by appropriate 
compensation in terms of growth of the general welfare of the country. 
 
 
                                                          
16 Cf. D. Comande’, Il nuovo welfare contrattuale nei negoziati collettivi nazionali: stato 
dell’arte e criticità, in Rivista del diritto della sicurezza sociale, 2017, p. 821 ff. 
17 See in this vein B. Caruso, The bright side of the moon: politiche del lavoro personalizzate 
e promozione del welfare occupazionale, in Rivista italiana di diritto del lavoro, 2016, I, p. 
177 ff. 
12  STEFANO GIUBBONI 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .IT – 388/2019 
8. Concluding remarks. 
The critical analysis just carried out on the ambiguous role of corporate 
welfare gives us in return an inevitably complex picture of the very same 
role that social partners carry out more in general – in the different 
contexts analysed in this paper – within the Italian social security system, 
broadly defined.  
The comparative industrial relations analyses frequently stress the 
fundamental “resilience”, as someone has said, of the role taken on by 
trade unions, especially as negotiating player18. The rate of coverage of 
national branch-collective agreements in Italy is still high. In fact, national 
collective agreements at sector level remain the centre of gravity of the 
Italian system of industrial relations and collective regulation. At the same 
time, no drift towards strong and unregulated decentralisation of collective 
bargaining has happened in Italy: the amount of workers covered by 
collective company agreements has not actually grown over these past 
years in Italy. It remains relatively low, mainly due to the structure of the 
country’s economic system, largely formed by small and medium 
enterprises. 
Obviously, this does not mean that the Italian system of industrial 
relations is not afflicted by major problems, which, to a certain extent, are 
similar to those suffered by other European countries. The fragmentation 
of the contractual system – presenting an abnormal number of national 
collective agreements – is perhaps the most evident among these 
problems, as it is a quite telling sign of an overall crisis of representativity 
suffered by the major trade union organizations, involving both the 
workers’ and the employers’ side; the strong wage compression and the 
remarkable increase of the working poor being its most disquieting result19. 
In this scenario in chiaroscuro, the role taken on by the social partners 
in the Italian welfare system is considered a significant driving force for the 
development of collective bargaining at its different levels. Contractual 
social security is a dynamic and articulated reality in Italy, and it certainly 
contributes to the overall upkeep of the Italian system of industrial 
relations as much as to the qualitative and quantitative increase of the 
entire supply of social protection for workers. At the same time, the highly 
unequal spreading of access to forms of supplementary pensions and even 
more to corporate welfare, broadly speaking, with persistent discrepancies 
between strong or weak areas (or segments) of the labour market, 
                                                          
18 M. Carrieri, T. Treu (eds.), Verso nuove relazioni industriali, Bologna, 2013. 
19 T. Treu, La questione salariale: legislazione sui minimi e contrattazione collettiva, WP CSDLE 
Massimo D’Antona, IT-386/2019. 
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highlights all the limits of a system, which is typically the Italian one, that 
is not rooted to a strong base of universal public social protection schemes. 
